Before we proceed further into the heavily illuminating “guts”
of this final chapter of Hedges’ book (available, if we haven’t mentioned
recently, from Nation Publishing—at online and brick and mortar bookstores
everywhere), let’s pause to look at what some of those who might disagree with
him are saying:
For instance, the article “The Myth of America’s Decline”
appeared in the April 2012 issue of The American Legion Magazine. While one might expect a heavily biased
viewpoint, the article is actually quite rationally argued and deserves
critique.
The author begins by resurrecting past quotes about America, by
famous Americans, about America’s decline.
The author makes the point that it didn’t turn out anywhere near what
the gloomy were saying.
The author is right as far as he goes. He just doesn’t go very far. He is correct that the US has bounced back
from lows in the past. What the author
doesn’t point out is that in those instances, the US did not have a crushing
debt burden. It also hadn’t shipped much
of its economic strength overseas, nor did it bleed its economic life away with
trade deficits that essentially transfer net wealth every month from this
country to others (for over 32 years now!).
It didn’t simultaneously have stranglehold corporations and billionaires
in control, certainly not combined with anemic or paralyzed government unable
to even summon the strength to oppose its own (and the people’s) strangling.
The author also gets caught in the same sort of short-term
fixation that Americans, in their seeming inability to think strategically and
long-term, get into too often. He fixes
on momentary events that mattered little in the long-view. He does point out the seeming strong position
of the US in the 1990s, and he is partially correct. Fresh from a sort of peace dividend following
the end of the Soviet Union, combined with fiscal prudence and the beginnings
of what would be a short-lived recovery for middle-class wages, the 1990s had
great promise to give us the foundation needed to change. The 2000s would wreck most all that.
The American economy is huge, no dispute. It gets great productivity out of a workforce
that combines a Protestant work ethic on steroids, with both fear and pitiless
competition, to give most all of its great productivity gains to those who
control capital (the worker shares little of it). But the author tries to imply
that its size, combined with the problems that other economies have and will
have, will be strong indicators for future success, which is non-sequitir. The problems of others do not mean good things
for you, in some zero-sum game fashion.
On the contrary, in today’s globalized world, problems elsewhere mean
problems here (Greece anyone?).
The author also insinuates that population growth is a benefit
and population decline is negative. Not
indicative! Perhaps if examined strictly
from a classical economic model, but there are multiple negatives to population
growth, even aside from environmental ones.
This factor is therefore very mixed.
Further, the author equates size with health and success when it
comes to corporations. It is amusing how
seemingly unaware and hypocritical people can be about that. They deride “big government” for its supposed
inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, but apply the opposite to
corporations. The author would do better
to see how much wealth these corporations have vacuumed to themselves, and how
blood drained that has left smaller corporations and businesses (and the rest
of us). Concentration of wealth and power a sign of strength? To who?
You don’t need to read Andrew Carnegie’s writings on this if you don’t
want; watch “Too Big To Fail” on HBO. It’s
even slanted in certain people’s favor, but you’ll still get the central idea
that we’ve created Leviathans that are bad for us (btw, those Leviathans need
broken up, not increased; we need anti-trust enforcement in a, pardon the pun,
big way).
The author does point out good strengths that we should build
on: US patent law and the Patent Office; our universities (for a while longer,
anyway); software; and that people want American products (even though most “American”
products aren’t made here). However,
pointing out that we’re spreading our cola drinking and fast food eating habits
to the rest of the world is not an example of health in any sense.
That America is not regularly tuning in, drinking up, or
researching foreign things is partially untrue, but we’ll jump over that
point. Jump over it to aim it back at
Americans and America for being too inward, a steep handicap in a globalized
world. And more to the exacting point,
CONSUMPTION is not a sign of strength (a point we seem unable to grasp).
The author stresses that our “entitlement” spending is
unsustainable, which is partially true.
Saying what he said is also a mantra for those who want to dismantle all
social safety nets, safety nets he touts as a strength elsewhere in his
article. It is additional mantra for
weakening government and transferring further wealth and power to the
plutocracy.
He is, however, correct in that our policymakers have the tools,
if not the will, to tackle our problems.
Soon, , however the tools may not work very well.
He is far off-base in pointing out the US military being a
source of strength. Hmm. To do what?
And all this “service” is provided to the rest of the world and they pay
next to nothing while we pay through the nose, meaning they are in essence
free-riders and we’re what, suckers? That
some places around the globe actually want us there (sometimes, only sort of,
but will concede the point) says what about our real “strength?” Because to look
so “strong” means about as much as the big neighborhood kid that nobody messes
with now, but inside is being eaten up by cancer.
The author pointing out that we spent more of our GDP on defense
in the Cold War, and had more troops under arms (for a less populous nation),
than we do now, is shallow analysis.
Maybe we are just finally feeling the cumulative effects of all that
resource expenditure made on unproductive things. Btw, we could afford more troops under arms
then, because a conscript military (and a far less technical one) was cheap in
comparison.
The author says we overcame worse economic crises in the 1930s
and 1970s. I could disagree with him on
the face of it, but even if I agreed with him, I would point him to paragraph
four above.
I will even agree with him that PRESENTLY, today’s asymmetric
threats DO pale compared to the potential threats to existence that came from
past powers. He doesn’t say it outright,
but I agree with his sentiment that we have succeeded greatly by creating a
system in which our rivals want to play in it (a notable achievement!), and
because of that, those rivals have a stake (however measured) in our success—and
we in theirs.
He is also right that the American basic system (outside its
corporate-dominated subversion) does hold universal appeal in its “political
pluralism, economic opportunity, cultural openness.” I disagree with him that those by themselves
give “the United States a decisive edge.”
Without specific actions, especially one to address deep and
system-threatening problems, generalities aren’t going to matter much. Wishing at some supposed magic tree, even one
with historical roots, does nothing without action. Just because you have BEEN great, does not
mean you are going to stay great, or even be ONE of the greats, without strong
action to confront reality. Believing that it will all “work out somehow,”
while going on with the same ruinous policies, will bring failure, perhaps
catastrophic failure (as it does eventually to all embracers of illusion).
The Romans too, were once “great,” were THE superpower, one in
which no one could envision a competitor taking its place. The Romans believed that about themselves. And did nothing to quit undermining the
foundations of their society. The end
came gradually, until finally the barbarians merely pushed in a rotten house.
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